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Social Ties and the Selection of China’s Political Elite†
By Raymond Fisman, Jing Shi, Yongxiang Wang, and Weixing Wu*
We study how sharing a hometown or college connection with an 
incumbent member of China’s Politburo affects a candidate’s 
 likelihood of selection as a new member. In specifications that include 
fixed effects to absorb quality differences across cities and colleges, 
we find that hometown and college connections are each associ-
ated with 5–9 percentage point reductions in selection  probability. 
This “connections penalty” is equally strong for  retiring Politburo 
members, arguing against  quota-based explanations, and it is much 
stronger for junior Politburo members, consistent with a role for 
 intra-factional competition. Our findings differ from  earlier work 
because of our emphasis on  within-group variation, and our focus 
on shared hometown and college, rather than shared workplace,  
connections. (JEL D72, O17, P26, Z13)
We study the selection of officials into the Central Politburo (hereafter Politburo), 
the most powerful body in the Chinese government. Beyond the direct  importance 
of understanding what determines the top leadership of the world’s most  populous 
nation (and second largest economy), our work may provide insights into the 
 complexities involved in bureaucratic promotion in political and  nonpolitical 
 organizations more generally.
The Politburo’s members are selected every five years from the members of the 
Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (hereafter the Central Committee), 
whose membership in turn is drawn from the top ranks of provincial officers, top 
military leaders, and central government ministers. While the Central Committee 
is nominally responsible for electing the Politburo (much as individual citizens are 
nominally responsible for electing Chinese officials at lower levels), as we discuss 
in the next section, in practice the Politburo itself is thought to have a decisive role in 
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selecting new members (see, for example, Nathan and Gilley 2003 and Shih 2016). 
In our paper, we examine whether Central Committee members who share a home-
town or college connection with an incumbent Politburo member are more likely to 
be elected to the next Politburo, using data from the  postwar period.
There is, ex ante, reason to expect that such shared backgrounds may provide a 
leg up in the Politburo selection process. For example, in writing about selection of 
the seventeenth Politburo, Susan Shirk observes that it was commonly perceived 
that Politburo selection “revolve[s] around the distribution of seats among person-
alistic factions—the networks of loyalty between senior political figures and the 
officials who have worked with them, are from the same region or studied at the 
same university and who have risen through the ranks with their patrons.”1 Such 
connections may also lead to higher selection rates because social ties facilitate the 
transmission of soft information on candidate quality (see, for example, Fisman, 
Paravisini, and Vig 2017).
We focus on several forms of connections, alluded to in the preceding quote, 
that have established precedence in earlier work: hometown (i.e., prefecture) ties, 
 college ties, and past employment relationships.2
We begin with our preferred specification, which includes fixed effects for shared 
hometown, college, and workplace. We argue that the inclusion of these fixed effects 
is useful for distinguishing between the role of shared backgrounds from unob-
served quality differences in candidates with shared attributes. For example, by far 
the most commonly represented college among Politburo members is Tsinghua 
University, which is also China’s most prestigious school. Simply controlling for 
higher educational attainment does not account for the difference between Tsinghua 
versus  lower-tier institutions.3
In these specifications, which account for quality differences across groups, we 
find that both hometown and college ties are associated with a lower probability 
of Politburo selection, a result that stands in contrast to recent work on  high-level 
promotion in China. For hometown ties, in our favored specification, which includes 
hometown fixed effects and a range of individual controls, a Politburo connection 
reduces the likelihood that a Central Committee member is elected by 5.1  percentage 
points, a 50 percent decline relative to the baseline selection rate for hometowns that 
have  within-hometown variation in Politburo connections. For college ties, the com-
parable figure is a 9 percentage point reduction in election probability. Accounting 
for workplace fixed effects, we observe no detectable relationship between work-
place ties and Politburo selection (as we explain in more detail below, shared work-
place may be more afflicted with upward bias, even in a fixed effects specification).
1 Susan Shirk, “China’s Next Leaders: A Guide to What’s at Stake,” New York Times, November 15, 2012 (http://
cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/11/15/c15shirk/en). 
2 Recent studies that examine the benefits of these types of connections in China include Cai (2014); 
Heidenheimer and Johnston (2011); Shih, Adolph, and Liu (2012); Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim (2015); Wang (2016); 
and Shih and Lee (2017), who explore their role in promotions in the Chinese bureaucracy, and Fisman et al. (2018), 
who study their role in election to the Chinese Academies of Science and Engineering.
3 To draw a comparison to the US setting, many law schools are represented among the judges on the various 
circuit and state supreme courts, yet only Harvard and Yale Law Schools are represented on the US Supreme Court. 
One would not wish to conclude that appointments to the country’s top court are the result of connections: indeed, 
incumbent justices have no role in selecting new members.
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We then examine the heterogeneity in this “connections penalty” to explore more 
deeply the patterns in the data, as well as to narrow down the set of plausible expla-
nations for this result. We begin by looking at heterogeneity based on the seniority 
of Politburo members. We show that the connections penalty results primarily from 
shared hometown and college connections to more junior Politburo members, which 
we suggest can most straightforwardly be reconciled with  intra-group competition 
(see, e.g., Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao 2016), in which leaders aim to maintain their 
dominant position within a group network (in our setting, the hometown or college 
network) by blocking potential challengers from within their own group. We next 
present heterogeneity analyses focused on assessing whether the connections pen-
alty might result from quotas or, relatedly, competition among groups from differ-
ent backgrounds for dominance in the Politburo. We do not measure a significant 
difference in the connections penalty for individuals from groups with one versus 
multiple ties to the Politburo, and also find that the connections penalty is almost 
identical for shared backgrounds with Politburo members who retire after the new 
Politburo is formed (i.e., they participate in the selection process, but do not remain 
in office in the following term). If quotas or competition between groups were a 
dominant force, we would expect coalitions to block hometowns or colleges with 
prominent representation from gaining further members, and we would anticipate 
finding no effect (or indeed the opposite sign) for connections to retiring members. 
Thus, these patterns together suggest that such explanations are less likely. In our 
last set of heterogeneity analyses, we examine how the connections penalty varies 
across time, by allowing it to vary with the identity of the country’s top leader. 
We find that, while we estimate a negative relationship between shared background 
and selection throughout our sample period, the connections penalty is far greater 
in under Mao’s rule, relative to the periods of that came after. Naturally, there are 
many changes that have taken place in Chinese polity during the  postwar period. 
It is nonetheless notable that, as we discuss in Section IIIA, Mao Zedong was par-
ticularly emphatic in his “ anti-factionalist” rhetoric, which could account for an 
aversion to promotions that, based on observables, might be perceived as favoring 
hometown or college “factions.”
Finally, because our results stand in such contrast to earlier findings, we explore 
in greater detail the differences that might account for our finding of a cost rather 
than benefit of shared background. We focus on three prominent recent studies 
(Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012; Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim 2015; and Francois, Trebbi, 
and Xiao 2016) that each finds a benefit of connections to  Politburo-level officials, 
based on shared work experience and/or shared hometown or college connections. 
After summarizing the various samples, estimation strategies, and variable defini-
tions employed in each paper in comparison with our own, we show that for spec-
ifications that are comparable to those of earlier papers, we also estimate a benefit 
of shared background in our data. The key differences between these results and 
those we report in our main specifications are the use of group fixed effects, and our 
emphasis on shared hometown and college backgrounds.
Overall, our results indicate that, at least for the highest and most visible levels 
of the Chinese polity, shared backgrounds may reduce the chances of promotion. 
These findings stand in contrast to the positive role of connections documented in 
earlier work (in addition to the quantitative research cited above, see Cai 2014 for a 
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 book-length treatment of this topic). Our work thus suggests a somewhat different 
view of the internal organization and promotion of China’s leadership. In particular, 
the “connections penalty” suggests the presence of forces within the government to 
balance representation in the Politburo, which may in part account for its longevity 
and perceived legitimacy.
Our analysis and findings also indicate the challenges in estimating the effect of 
shared background on promotion, as well as the range of potential interpretations, 
which are far more complex than simply  higher-level officials helping their friends 
climb the bureaucracy.
We contribute to the literature that aims to understand the selection of officials in 
China specifically, and promotion in bureaucracies (political and otherwise) more 
generally. Our work also links to a larger body of research on the determinants 
and consequences of promotional structures throughout the Chinese hierarchy. Jia, 
Kudamatsu, and Seim (2015), for example, reports a complementary effect of con-
nections and performance in determining provincial leaders’ promotions,4 while 
Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) explores the role of promotions and thus career 
concerns in governing the policy choices of provincial leaders (Kung 2014, in an 
analysis of grain distribution during the Great Famine, shows in particular how such 
promotional concerns can misfire). Our work also contributes to our understanding 
of the role of connections in China more broadly, linking to the vast literature on 
guanxi ties (for recent empirical examples, see Fisman et al. 2018 on the role of 
connections in election to the Chinese Academies of Science and Engineering, and 
Kung and Ma 2016 on the value of connections for small business growth).
Finally, we see our paper as contributing to the much larger literature on promo-
tion in bureaucracies more generally. This is a topic for which there is a rich body 
of theoretical and, more recently, empirical research in personnel economics. Much 
of the earlier work in this area focused on promotion within  for-profits (see, e.g., 
Lazear and Shaw 2007 for an early survey), whereas more recently research on pro-
motion in state bureaucracies has flourished (Finan, Olken, and Pande 2017).
I. Background and Data
A. The Organization of the Chinese Polity
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Central Committee) 
is a political body that comprises the top leaders of the Communist Party. Its 
 members are selected at the convening of the National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China, under the guidance of the Politburo.5 While the number of Central 
Committee members fluctuates from term to term (and has grown over time), it has 
had  approximately 200 members in each term since the early 1970s.
The Central Committee’s membership includes national leaders, chief officers 
at institutions that are under the direct control of the Central Committee (e.g., the 
4 We do not observe any effect of performance, whether directly or conditional on connections, in our own data, 
but provincial leaders represent only about one-fifth of our sample.
5 Starting with the Central Committee’s eleventh term, which began in 1977, the National Congress has been 
held every five years. Prior to that, the Congress was held at less regular intervals.
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Organization Department and the Propaganda Department), heads of  ministries 
under the control of the State Council (China’s chief administrative body), 
 provincial  governors and party secretaries, chief military officers, and leaders from 
eight “People’s Organizations” (e.g., the  All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
and the Communist Youth League) who also hold the rank of minister. The Central 
Committee meets at least annually, to discuss and refine formal government policies.
A set of alternate members are also selected for the Central Committee. 
While these alternates generally attend the same meetings (and hence may voice 
 opinions) they lack voting rights. Alternates (who number roughly 170) also serve 
as  replacements for full members of the Central Committee who die or are other-
wise removed from office during the term. Importantly from our perspective, alter-
nate members,  themselves generally  high-ranking provincial or city officials, are 
 promoted to full membership at relatively high rates, making them a natural pool of 
candidates to examine for promotion to the Central Committee. (As noted below, 
in contrast to the Politburo, the full set of individuals who are eligible for Central 
Committee election is not  well defined, nor is the candidate list made public.)
The de facto leadership of the government resides within the Politburo, a collec-
tion of approximately 25 top leaders selected from the membership of the Central 
Committee at its first convening, which takes place immediately following the 
National Congress. In most terms, a small number of additional members are also 
elected during later Central Committee meetings to replace Politburo members lost 
to death, removed due to corruption, or purged for political reasons (especially 
during the Cultural Revolution).6 Other than the twelfth term ( 1982–1987), during 
which ten members retired and were replaced by six new members, the number 
of  midterm replacements is generally very small. Throughout, we will include all 
Politburo members selected at any point during a term as new members, and will 
code their connections based on the composition of the Politburo at the time of 
selection.
While, nominally speaking, the Central Committee is elected by the National 
Congress and the Politburo elected by the Central Committee, in practice the 
 composition of both bodies is determined before any ballots are cast. Politburo 
selection follows a “single candidate election rule” whereby the number of candi-
dates is exactly equal to the number of available seats. The key to understanding 
Politburo selection is thus understanding the origin of the candidate list presented to 
the Central Committee.
The candidate selection process is veiled in secrecy, so we cannot state in any 
factual or categorical sense that it is done by the incumbent Politburo. There is 
nonetheless a  widely held view that the process is driven by the Politburo (in par-
ticular the Standing Committee). Shih (2016), for example, asserts that “Politburo 
member selection is ultimately done through the [Politburo Standing Committee’s] 
collective leadership’s votes.” Nathan and Gilley (2003), in describing the selec-
tion of the Politburo’s new membership in 2002, referred to the process as follows: 
“[new members] were considered and approved for promotion by the outgoing 
6 It may be argued that Politburo members who die while in office may still influence the selection of their 
 successors. There are 15 such cases in our data; our results are virtually unchanged if we assume that candidates 
who share a hometown, college, or workplace with recently deceased Politburo members are connected.
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 leaders, who could draw on detailed confidential reports on each of them compiled 
by the Party’s secretive, highly trusted Organization Department.” 7 By contrast, the 
Central Committee’s role is simply that of a rubber stamp, approving the (fixed) list 
generated by the Politburo (for example, Li 2008, observes that “the notion that the 
Central Committee ‘elects’ the Politburo is something of a fiction”).
In secondary analyses, we also look at transitions within the Central Committee 
from alternate to full membership. While the search for Central Committee nom-
inees is very broad, Central Committee alternates are selected at very high rates 
(in our data, about one-fifth are “promoted” to the Central Committee each term). 
Since the list of potential Central Committee members is never disclosed, the set 
of alternates thus presents one credible pool for studying promotion one step down 
from the Politburo. In the early part of our sample, the Central Committee “election” 
followed a single candidate rule, just as with the Politburo. While in 1987 the candi-
date list expanded relative to the number of positions, the “inner party democracy” 
that this introduced was modest to say the least. For example, in the 2012 Central 
Committee election, there were 108 candidates for every 100 positions. Thus, for 
Central Committee selection the key question is, once again, how the candidate lists 
are formed. In this case it is much more straightforward: the process is conducted 
and controlled by the Politburo. As documented in government sources  describing 
Central Committee selection, the Politburo Standing Committee forms a set of 
search groups which are sent across the country to identify promising candidates. 
This initial stage leads to a very large set of potential candidates that is winnowed 
down to a shorter “primary list” that goes forward to final selection. Just ahead of 
the meeting of the National Congress, the Politburo selects the final candidates.8
To summarize, while the selection of the slate of formal Politburo nominees (who 
are then automatically elected as Politburo members) is secretive, there is a widely 
held consensus that the incumbent Politburo controls the process (and similarly 
 controls the generation of the Central Committee candidate list).
B. Data
Our analysis requires background information on the full set of Central 
Committee  members (including the small subset that are Politburo members). 
Our starting point for developing this database is the People’s Daily Online list of 
Central Committee members, maintained by the Communist Party of China, which 
7 Nathan and  Gilley (2003) provides profiles of potential Politburo members that, they claim, were based 
on  top-secret dossiers that were compiled for the “use of the outgoing Politburo to pick candidates for the new 
Politburo and its Standing Committee. These dossiers were so highly confidential as to be denied even to Central 
Committee members.” Thus, beyond asserting that the incumbent Politburo was responsible for selection, Gilley 
and Nathan further imply that not even Central Committee members were privy to documents evaluating potential 
incoming Politburo members.
8 The interested reader may consult Tsai and Kao (2012) for a description of the selection of the eighteenth 
Central Committee candidate list. They describe a process in which a countrywide team of investigators, numbering 
as many as 1,000, put forth potential names for consideration. However, the decision of which names move forward 
once again rests with the Politburo. In particular, they observe that, “the investigative teams present their results 
for the initial name list to the Politburo, which then formulates a formal name list of preliminary candidates for 
Central Committee membership.” For official government documentation of the process, the following description 
is available in Chinese: http://m.cnr.cn/news/20171024/t20171024_523997959.html (last accessed April 25, 2019).
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includes information going back to the seventh term ( 1945–1956).9 Background 
information on these individuals, including place of birth, year of birth, and detailed 
education and work history, may be found via the Political Elites of the Communist 
Party of China (National Chengchi University 2019).
Only a few candidates from the ninth and tenth term election cycles ( 1969–1973 
and  1973–1977) are not contained in the database, since they are not  minister-level 
officials. They are instead  lower-level officials elected to the Central Committee 
during the Cultural Revolution who, by virtue of their celebrity status as “ working 
class heroes,” are easily tracked down via individual search results from Baidu 
Baike, the Chinese equivalent of Google.10
Our main outcome measure is  Elected it , an indicator variable denoting that 
 candidate i was selected for term t of the Politburo. As noted in Section IA, while 
almost all new Politburo members are selected at the Central Committee’s first 
meeting, replacement members may also be chosen at  midterm meetings. We 
set  Elected it = 1 for all individuals elected during term t regardless of when during 
the term they are selected. While Politburo members at term  t − 1 are eligible for 
membership also at term  t , we omit them from our analysis, as they are generally 
reelected unless of retirement age.
We also use these data to measure shared backgrounds between Central 
Committee members (who comprise the full set of eligible Politburo candidates) 
and incumbent Politburo members.
Consider first our measure based on shared hometown. We define candidate  i for 
Politburo term  t to be  hometown-connected ( CityTie = 1 ) if there exists at least 
one Politburo member at term  t − 1 (and hence in the Politburo when selection of 
the term  t Politburo takes place) who is from the same prefecture as i. Note,  CityTie 
can be measured from the eighth term ( 1956–1969) onward, since we require lagged 
observations of the Politburo to calculate connections of candidates to incumbent 
Politburo members. Our data end with the nineteenth term ( 2017–2022).
We similarly construct  CollegeTie based on Central Committee and Politburo 
members’ undergraduate institutions, for the eighth through nineteenth terms. (For 
candidates without a college degree, we set  CollegeTie = 0 , and in all relevant 
specifications we include variables to capture a candidate’s highest level of educa-
tion, to avoid conflating the role of shared background with educational attainment.)
For shared work background, we require that Politburo candidates and Politburo 
incumbents have a period of overlap in their work histories, more specifically a 
period of time in which both worked in the same organization/department in the 
same prefecture.11
While no single position within the Central Committee guarantees Politburo 
membership, some positions tend to be elected at much higher rates than others. We 
9 We also begin our data in the  postwar period because it is when Mao came to power. In the previous term, 
which stretched from 1928 to 1947, the Chinese central government was also structured quite differently. For 
 example, the Central Committee had only 23 members, as compared to the approximately 200 members it has had 
for most of the  postwar period.
10 For 30 Central Committee members, no college was listed, but either a master’s or PhD institution was 
 provided. We treat these individuals as having no college connection, but in practice our results are unchanged if 
we drop them from the sample.
11 We have also coded a variable to denote connections via the military, and find that it has no correlation with 
Elected.
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therefore include controls for whether a Central Committee member is a military 
officer (Military); an indicator denoting that an individual is the party secretary of 
one of the  directly controlled municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, or 
is the party secretary of Guangdong (4_Leaders) since these are positions that have 
most commonly (but by no means always) seen representation in the Politburo; an 
indicator variable for provincial governors and party secretaries (Province); and to 
account for political dynasties we include the variable Princeling, which captures 
whether any of the candidate’s parents or  parents-in-law ever served in the Politburo. 
We also include, where relevant, hometown, workplace, and college fixed effects to 
capture average differences in the rate of Politburo selection as a function of these 
background characteristics.
Our data include 1,273 distinct candidates, 654 of whom appear only once in our 
data. A substantial number also appear as candidates twice (409 individuals) and 
three or more times (210 individuals). We define PriorCandidacies as the number of 
previous terms an individual appeared as a ( non-Politburo) member of the Central 
Committee. We control for prior candidacies throughout, given the higher likelihood 
of success for longer tenured Central Committee members.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the main variables we employ in our main 
analysis. Observe that shared workplace experiences are by far the most common 
form of connection, despite our requirement that individuals overlap both in depart-
ment and prefecture. This statistic emphasizes the fact that political elites often 
come up through similar career channels, with many spending time at the Secretariat 
of the Central Committee (71 distinct candidates) and the Organization Department 
of the Central Committee (48 distinct candidates), both located in Beijing. College 
ties are the least prevalent form of shared background. This arises, at least in part, 
because nearly one-third of candidates (concentrated in the earlier part of our sam-
ple) did not complete a college degree and hence have no college tie.
Before turning to our results, we also note some patterns in the data which we 
see as emphasizing the need to account for quality differences across city, college, 
and workplace groups. Consider first college attendance. The concern over qual-
ity differences is underscored by a comparison of colleges with frequent Politburo 
ties versus those with no Politburo representation at all. For example, by far the 
most common college of attendance for Politburo members in the  post-Mao era 
is Tsinghua University (12 members, or 12.2 percent of the sample), also China’s 
most prestigious university.12 Peking University, the country’s  second-ranked 
school, produced the  second-most Politburo members (6.1 percent) since 1982. The 
pool of Central Committee candidates is also dominated by individuals from elite 
schools, though less so than the Politburo: 5.0 percent of Central Committee mem-
bers attended Tsinghua, 4.6 percent attended Peking University, and more broadly 
elite universities are  overrepresented. Overall, the patterns in the data suggest that 
there is positive selection on education as one rises through the bureaucracy, and 
hence a need to try to control for it. Indeed, most candidates are from universities 
that are never represented on the Politburo: for our full sample of Central Committee 
members, only 21 colleges provide a connection to Politburo member (out of the 
12 Far fewer Politburo members were college-educated prior to 1982. Tsinghua is still the dominant college of 
Politburo members if we use the entire sample.
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435 colleges represented). However, these 21 schools are vastly overrepresented: 
276 of 1,648  candidate-term observations (16.8 percent) attended one of these 21 
institutions.
Our data on work histories suggest similar  quality-related concerns, exacerbated 
by the fact that individuals on a fast track through the bureaucracy will be assigned 
to more prestigious postings in expectation of rapid promotion. Every Politburo in 
our dataset has had at least one member with work experience on the State Council, 
the country’s top administrative body; the same is true for the Shanghai municipal 
government, described by Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016) and others as a fre-
quent assignment for future leaders. The current Party Secretary Xi Jinping is a case 
in point. He was appointed by the Politburo to be party secretary of Shanghai in 
March 2007, and was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee (thus resigning 
from his party secretary position) just seven months later. In fact, he was (endoge-
nously) sent to Shanghai in anticipation of possible promotion, which underscores 
that particular problems associated with the use of work ties as a measure of connec-
tions: given that the Politburo itself is responsible for  higher-level postings, it may 
promote talented officials to particular positions to groom them for higher office.
There is a much less obvious hierarchical ranking of birthplace prefectures. But 
it is perhaps notable that, for example, Huang Gang prefecture is  well  represented 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Varible name Mean SD Observations
Elected to Politburo 0.070 0.256 2,176
CityTie 0.173 0.378 2,176
CollegeTie 0.113 0.316 2,176
WorkTie 0.559 0.497 2,176
CityorCollegeTie 0.260 0.439 2,176
log(Age) 4.052 0.142 2,176
PriorCandidacies 0.601 0.871 2,176
Provincial 0.226 0.418 2,176
Military 0.201 0.401 2,176
4_Leaders 0.012 0.111 2,176
Princeling 0.016 0.126 2,176
Male 0.942 0.234 2,176
College 0.720 0.449 2,176
Master 0.210 0.407 2,176
Doctor 0.067 0.250 2,176
Notes:  Elected to Politburo is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the can-
didate shared his city of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of 
election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate went to the same uni-
versity as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CityorCollegeTie 
is an indicator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 .  WorkTie is an indica-
tor variable denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same department in the same city at 
the same time as at least one Politburo member.  PriorCandidacies is the number of previous 
terms the individual was a  Politburo-eligible member of the Central Committee.  Provincial is 
an indicator variable denoting that the candidate was provincial governor or party secretary 
at the time of the election.  Military is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate was a 
 high-ranking military official at the time of the election.  4 _ Leaders is an indicator variable 
denoting that the candidate was the party secretary of one of three municipalities, Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Tianjin, or the party secretary of Guangdong.  Princeling denotes that one or 
more of the candidate’s parents or  parents-in-law ever served as a Politburo member.  Male 
denotes the candidate’s gender.  College ,  Master , and  Doctor denote completion of bachelor’s, 
master’s, and doctoral degrees.
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on the Politburo (with at least one individual born there in all but one term in our 
 sample). It is noted for its long history of producing top politicians and military 
 leaders (see, e.g., Jiang 2011). Changsha, the city in which Mao began his polit-
ical career and laid the foundations of the Communist Party, is also  well repre-
sented, with as many Politburo members as Shanghai, a city more than three 
times its size. As with  colleges, candidates from hometowns that have at least one 
Politburo  representative during the sample are much more prevalent on the Central 
Committee. Of the 273 hometowns represented on the Central Committee in our 
sample, 62 (22.6 percent) have at least one Politburo connection, whereas these 62 
hometowns provide 54 percent of our  candidate-year observations. (There are no 
 always-connected hometowns nor any  always-connected colleges.)
In Table 2 we present the unconditional means of the selection rates for Central 
Committee members with and without Politburo connections, as well as their dif-
ferences. We find that those with shared backgrounds are selected at higher rates for 
each of our three measures. This difference is modest and statistically insignificant 
for shared hometown and college ties (1.1 and 2.0 percentage points respectively), 
and somewhat larger and significant for shared workplace (5.5 percentage points). 
As noted above, we are concerned that these differences reflect an upward bias 
based on quality differences across individuals with more versus less prestigious 
backgrounds, which leads us to the fixed effects specifications we present in the 
next section.
II. Results
Our main analyses explore the relationship between shared backgrounds and 
Politburo selection, including a range of controls. Our specifications all take the 
following form:
(1)  Elected it = β ×  Connection it c +  γ c +  ω t +  ϵ it ,
Table 2—Difference in Mean Politburo Election Rates by Connection Status
Fraction elected to Politburo
Tie = 1 Tie = 0
Observations Mean SD Observations Mean SD Difference
CityTie 376 0.0798 0.2713 1,800 0.0683 0.2524 0.0115
(0.0145)
CollegeTie 245 0.0898 0.2865 1,279 0.0696 0.2545 0.0202
(0.0181)
WorkTie 1,217 0.0945 0.2926 959 0.0396 0.1952 0.0549
(0.0110)
Notes:  Elected is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central Committee was elected to the 
Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his city of birth with an individual who 
was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate went 
to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  WorkTie is an indicator 
variable denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same department in the same city at the same time as at least 
one Politburo member.
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where  Elected it is an indicator variable denoting that Central Committee member 
i was elected to the Politburo for term t, and  Connection it c denotes that candidate 
i was connected to at least one incumbent Politburo member via connection type 
 c ∈  {CityTie, CollegeTie, WorkTie} . For each type of connection, we include 
a full set of fixed effects for the source of the tie. So when we measure connec-
tions by hometown ties we include 219 hometown fixed effects; similarly, we have 
264  college fixed effects for the college tie specification, and 305 workplace fixed 
effects for the workplace tie specification.13 The variable  ω t is a term fixed effect, 
and  ϵ it is an error term clustered at the  candidate-level.
We present our main ordinary least squares (OLS) results in Table 3. In column 
1, in which we use CityTie as our connection measure and include hometown fixed 
effects,  hometown-connected candidates are 6.2 percentage points less likely to be 
selected as Politburo members ( p-value  < 0.01). In column 2 we use CollegeTie 
as our measure of connections; for specifications using this measure of shared back-
ground, we include only college graduates in the sample, to avoid conflating the 
effects of alumni connections and educational attainment. Again, we find a negative 
impact on Politburo election, of 10.9 percentage points (significant at the 1 percent 
level). In column 3, with WorkTie as the connections measure and workplace fixed 
13 We include fixed effects for all  city-department combinations for which there exists at least one overlap in the 
workplace histories of a Politburo member and a Central Committee member.
Table 3—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability
Elected to Politburo









Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,118 1,357 2,176 1,954 2,118 1,357 2,176 1,954
 R 2 0.109 0.209 0.305 0.234 0.212 0.327 0.386 0.311
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his city 
of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator vari-
able denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the 
time of election.  WorkTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same department in 
the same city at the same time as at least one Politburo member.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting 
that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eligible terms, 
a dummy variable for provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for the party 
 secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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effects, we find a precisely estimated  near-zero effect, and can reject at a 95 percent 
confidence level a positive work tie effect of greater than 3 percentage points.
The precisely estimated zero on shared work experience has several plausible 
interpretations. Recall that it is, by far, the most common form of connection in our 
data, as a result of the very common career trajectories of leading politicians. It may 
thus reflect a relative unimportance of shared work background, or the coarseness 
of our measure.14
We next define a more inclusive measure of shared back-
ground,  CityorCollegeTie ,  an  indicator variable denoting either  CityTie = 1 
or  CollegeTie = 1 . While in almost all cases we continue to show results for city 
and college ties separately, it will be useful also to define this aggregate measure 
to allow for a more parsimonious specification when we turn to examine het-
erogeneity in the “connections penalty” in the next section. In column 4 we use 
 CityorCollegeTie as the main explanatory variable. We employ a specification that 
includes hometown and undergraduate institution fixed effects, as well as an indica-
tor variable for  college completion. The coefficient on  CityorCollegeTie is −0.074 
( p-value  < 0.01), in line with the individual estimates of shared hometown and 
college backgrounds. (While the estimated coefficient in column  4 should intui-
tively be an average of those in columns 1 and 2, the relationship is not mechanically 
implied, given the different sets of fixed effects and samples.)
We include additional  candidate-level controls in columns 5–8, which leads 
to a small reduction in our estimates of the effect of hometown and college con-
nections on Politburo selection.15 The coefficient on  CityTie in column 4 implies 
a 5.1  percentage point reduction in the probability of Politburo selection (signif-
icant at the 1 percent level). Relative to the selection base rate of 10.3 percent 
for  CityTie = 0 candidates (from hometowns with variation in this variable), 
our estimate implies that a hometown tie reduces a candidate’s election proba-
bility by about 50 percent. The coefficient on  CollegeTie in column 5 implies a 
9.3   percentage  point reduction in the probability of Politburo selection, which 
also reflects a large impact given the base rate of election of 11.8  percent 
for  CollegeTie = 0 candidates (who graduated from colleges with some varia-
tion in  CollegeTie ). The stability of our coefficients with the inclusion of con-
trols at least mitigates concerns surrounding unobserved  within-group differences 
in the quality (arising, for example, from differential  selection onto the Central 
Committee) of connected versus unconnected candidates.
One concern is that the inclusion of group fixed effects may create a mechanical 
negative relationship between connections and selection, because a group with no 
connections at term t becomes connected at  t + 1 precisely because a  well-qualified 
candidate from the group at time  t was elected in order to create the connection. This 
14 This has led other researchers to focus on particular work locales as nexuses of connection formation. 
Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016), for example, highlights “the exceptionality of the Shanghai political machine” 
and thus look at the  so-called Shanghai Gang of officials who worked in the Shanghai municipal bureaucracy in 
some capacity. As captured by the example of Xi Jinping, however, it may be particularly prone to concerns of 
endogenous work assignment. Furthermore, when we look at the effect of Shanghai Gang connections using the 
definition of Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016) in a fixed effects specification, we estimate a negative effect, though 
very imprecisely measured.
15 We suppress the coefficient estimates on the control variables in all tables to conserve space. For Table 3, 
which provides our main results, we show the full regression output in Appendix Table A1.
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bias may be exacerbated by the fixed effects, which emphasize the  within-group 
variation in connections. To assess the extent to which this is likely a  first-order 
concern, we analyze a subsample of the data that includes only the  candidate-term 
observations when an individual first appears in the Central Committee (and hence 
as a candidate for the Politburo). This removes from the sample the “leftover” 
 candidates who are passed over (and thus remain in the candidate pool for the next 
term) when a group member is elected. Assuming that the quality of new arrivals at 
the Central Committee is independent across terms, the selecting out of  high-quality 
candidates should be less of a concern in this subsample.
We present these results in Table 4, which estimates equation (1) on the  subsample 
of  first-time candidates. The point estimates reflecting the connections penalty 
for hometown and college ties are somewhat diminished, as are the base election 
rates:  first-time candidates are generally selected less often. For our aggregated 
measure, the estimated coefficient declines only a small amount. While this test 
does not  provide a decisive rejection of the  selecting-out hypothesis (for example, 
the  selecting out of higher quality candidates could take place below the Central 
Committee level), it does provide some suggestive evidence to the contrary. We 
note that there is a small positive correlation between workplace ties and selection 
in column 3, which is reduced in magnitude and significance with the addition of 
controls in column 7.
Table 4—Politburo Ties and  First-Time Candidate Election Probability
Elected to Politburo









Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,166 582 1,270 839 1,166 582 1,270 839
 R 2 0.196 0.251 0.494 0.328 0.291 0.366 0.594 0.352
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his city 
of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator vari-
able denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the 
time of election.  WorkTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same department in 
the same city at the same time as at least one Politburo member.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting 
that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eligible terms, 
a dummy variable for provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for the party 
 secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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III. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty
Having established a robust negative  within-group correlation between shared 
hometown/college backgrounds and election to the Politburo, we now turn to 
exploring how this “connections penalty” varies with the type of candidate or 
connection. Our analyses are guided by an interest in better understanding the 
mechanisms underlying our main result. We thus begin by laying out potential 
 explanations for the connections penalty, and what patterns each may imply in the 
data. Throughout this section, we focus on hometown and college ties (given the 
lack of any discernible effect of workplace ties on selection) as well as our  combined 
measure,  CityorCollegeTie .
A. Potential Explanations for the Connections Penalty
In this section we describe three main classes of explanations for the connections 
penalty: (i)  anti-factionalism; (ii)  intra-group competition; and (iii) quotas and/or 
 inter-group competition.
 (i)  Anti-Factionalist Ideology.—We begin with an explanation which turns 
the more standard favoritism intuition on its head: given concerns of favor-
ing one’s own group, Communist Party leaders have, since the Communist 
Revolution, inveighed against the dangers of “factionalism,” and may have 
used Politburo selection as a visible and salient means of setting an example. 
The  anti-factionalist rhetoric was fervent under China’s  postwar leader, Mao 
Zedong, who argued that it was harmful to both the collective and the indi-
vidual if one chose to support another simply “because he is an old acquain-
tance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old 
colleague or old subordinate.”16 In addition to its prominence in Mao’s rhet-
oric,  anti-factionalism was written into the Communist Party’s constitution 
during the 7th National Congress on June 11, 1945.17
   Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, carried the torch of  anti-factionalism 
forward, vociferously denying that he or Mao was ever associated with any 
faction and, like Mao, Deng spoke out against factions as impediments to 
party unity.18
   Concerns of  in-group favoritism led the government to impose rules, dat-
ing back to at least the early 1990s, with the express purpose of preventing 
local officials from favoring those from their home regions. Given the potent 
 anti-factionalist rhetoric deployed by leaders in the  postwar period, and per-
haps the resulting desire to set an example (despite the absence of any formal 
restrictions on Politburo selection), connections may plausibly have been a 
liability rather than an advantage in Politburo selection.
16 From The Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume II, translation obtained from https://www.marxists.org/
reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_03.htm.
17 See in particular the General Principles, and also Article 23 of Section 1.
18 See, for example, Deng’s 1989 speech, “We must form a promising collective leadership that will carry out 
reform,” reprinted in The Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III.
1766 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2020
    We see this explanation primarily as a residual category for variation that 
is not  well explained by other theories. Given Mao’s particularly strong 
 anti-factionalist writings, variation in the strength of the connections penalty 
over time (which we present at the end of Section IIIB) may provide a very 
tentative link to this explanation.
 (ii) Intra-Group Competition.—Politburo members with shared backgrounds 
may compete for status and resources, and thus may wish to suppress the 
promotion of potential competitors. Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016), for 
example, emphasizes competition among  co-factional officials at the same 
level of the bureaucratic hierarchy. We take a similar view, in presuming 
that competition is more intense among individuals within a group at more 
comparable levels of seniority. In particular, more senior Politburo members, 
those in the Standing Committee, may be less concerned with the promotion 
of others within their group to more junior positions on the Politburo (there 
are only 13 instances in our data of politicians going straight from the Central 
Committee to the PSC). We conjecture, therefore, that  intra-group compe-
tition may lead to a stronger connection penalty for  non-PSC connections 
relative to PSC connections.
 (iii) Quotas or  Inter-Group Competition.—The same  anti-factionalist motiva-
tions described in (i) above could operate effectively as a quota (even in the 
absence of explicit rules at the Politburo level). Relatedly (and with similar 
predictions), as emphasized in Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016), groups 
may aim to limit any individual faction within the government from  gaining 
too much power. This class of explanations for the connections  penalty 
implies that Central Committee members of  already-prevalent groups 
should have a higher connections penalty. To assess this possibility, we look 
at heterogeneity based on the prevalence of groups (in particular, whether 
a group has more than one member, or is the largest group) in the incum-
bent Politburo. We also compare the penalty from connections to incum-
bents who remain in the new Politburo, versus members who retire when 
the new Politburo is formed, as the latter group should not affect quotas or 
 between-group  power-sharing.
B. Heterogeneity in the Connections Penalty: Results
We begin by examining how the connections penalty varies as a function of 
the seniority of incumbent Politburo members. To do so, we include disaggre-
gated  versions of each of our connection variables, to allow for a differential effect 
of Standing Committee (suffix  PSC ) versus more junior Politburo incumbents 
( suffix  nonPSC ). We present these results in Table 5, for shared hometown and col-
lege ties, as well as our aggregated connection measure,  CityorCollegeTie .
In columns 1 and 4 we show the results with  CityorCollegeTie _ PSC 
and  CityorCollegeTie _ nonPSC as explanatory variables, with and without con-
trols. In both cases, the estimated coefficient on ties to the Standing Committee 
is close to zero, and significantly different (at least at the 10 percent level) 
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from  CityorCollegeTie _ nonPSC , which is negative, and indicates a connections 
penalty of roughly 7 percentage points. In the remaining columns, we present results 
for  CityTie and  CollegeTie separately, and observe that, while the  non-PSC versus 
PSC difference is negative for both hometown and college connections, given the 
lack of precision in these specifications, we cannot reject the equality of coefficients 
in either case at the 10 percent level.
As noted in Section  IIIA, the larger penalty for connections to more junior 
Politburo members is consistent with officials within a group viewing others at a 
comparable level as potential competitors. Naturally, given the observational nature 
of our data we cannot rule out other explanations that might be consistent with this 
pattern: for example, more senior members may use their influence to overcome a 
connections penalty that exists for other reasons.
We next turn to heterogeneity along two dimensions that relate to  quota-based 
explanations for the connections penalty.
We begin with heterogeneity by a group’s prevalence among Politburo incum-
bents, which we implement by augmenting our earlier specifications with explan-
atory variables that allow for a differential effect for cities or colleges with a 
larger number of Politburo members in a given term. For our first measure of this 
Table 5—PSC and nonPSC Ties and Candidate Election Probability
Elected to Politburo













Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
PSC = nonPSC (  p-value) 0.071 0.105 0.606 0.044 0.147 0.667
Observations 1,954 1,954 1,357 1,954 2,118 1,357
 R 2 0.234 0.233 0.209 0.311 0.213 0.326
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his city 
of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable 
denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of 
election.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . For each type of 
connection, PSC denotes a shared background with a Standing Committee member and nonPSC denotes a shared 
background with a Politburo member not on the Standing Committee. Individual controls include gender, age, 
 education, previous eligible terms, a dummy variable for provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, 
a dummy variable for the party secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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“extensive margin” of connections, we generate indicator variables for hometowns 
and colleges with two or more ties in a given term (i.e.,  I  (CityTies ≥ 2) and 
 I  (CollegeTies ≥ 2) ).19 We also consider a variant based on our aggregated 
 connection measure to denote whether a candidate is from a hometown with two or 
more connections or from an undergraduate institution with two or more connec-
tions ( I (CityTies ≥ 2 ⋃ CollegeTies ≥ 2) ).
We provide these results in the first three columns of Table 6 (to conserve space 
we present results only with full controls: the results without full controls are virtu-
ally identical). After accounting for the existence of at least one tie (via the variables 
used in our main analysis), the incremental role of multiple ties is negative, though 
very noisily measured.
In our second set of measures to capture group prominence, we 
define  LargestCityTie , to denote candidates who share their hometown with the 
most commonly represented hometown among Politburo incumbents in a given 
term. We analogously define  LargestCollegeTie for ties to the most prevalent college 
among Politburo incumbents, and  LargestCityorCollegeTie if  LargestCityTie = 1 
or  LargestCollegeTie = 1 . The largest group measures capture prominence in a 
particular term, which varies across time.20 We present results based on these alter-
native measures of group prominence in columns 4–6 of Table 6. Across all spec-
ifications, the estimated coefficient on the largest group variable is close to zero, 
though noisily measured, which does not allow us to draw any strong conclusions 
on how the connections penalty varies with group prominence.
In Table 7 we allow the connections penalty to vary as a function of whether 
incumbent Politburo member retires in the next term. To do so, we define vari-
ables (which are not mutually exclusive) for shared backgrounds with incumbent 
Politburo members who remain in office the following term ( CityTie _ nonRetire , 
etc.) and those that retire ( CityTie _ Retire , etc.). Again, we show our results only for 
specifications with full controls to conserve space, though the results are unchanged 
with the inclusion/exclusion of control variables. For both hometown and college 
ties, as well as our aggregate  CityorCollegeTie variables, we estimate very simi-
lar negative coefficients for both retiring and  non-retiring Politburo members. This 
result argues against  quota-based explanations and, similarly, those based on efforts 
to prevent individual groups from gaining undue influence within the Politburo.
In our final set of heterogeneity analyses, we explore how the connections penalty 
varies over time. We focus on our overall connections measure,  CityorCollegeTie , 
given the sparseness of our data when we allow the role of shared backgrounds 
to vary by time period, and include in all specifications both undergraduate insti-
tution and hometown fixed effects. In the first two columns, we divide our data 
19 There are few instances with more than two ties, which makes it difficult to look at how selection is affected 
as the number of ties grows. For example, the highest number of ties of a given hometown in our sample is 3, which 
occurs for Huang Gang, Tianjin, Changsha, and Shanghai. In only 5 of 12 terms in our data are there hometowns 
with 3 Politburo members. There is similar sparseness for college ties: only 1.7 percent of candidates are ever con-
nected to three or more members via a college alumni tie. We look at these cases when we consider the largest group 
in each term in the second part of Table 6.
20 Because relatively few hometowns or colleges ever have more than two representatives in the Politburo, 
there is much overlap between the measures in the two parts of Table 6. For example, 6.7 percent of candidates are 
connected via  LargestCityorCollegeTie , which is only a little less than the 8.5 percent of candidates connected via 
a group with two or more incumbents.
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into three (roughly equal) time periods:  Mao (terms  7–11),  Deng (terms  12–14), 
and  postDeng (terms  15–19). Table 8 presents results with variants on our main spec-
ification, with  CityorCollegeTie × TimePeriod as explanatory variables for each of 
the three periods. The connections penalty is more than twice as large under Mao, 
relative to the other two time periods, which have  near-identical (though imprecisely 
 estimated) coefficients. A test for equality of coefficients between the earlier versus 
later two periods is rejected at the 10 percent level in the specification with controls. 
In column 3 we include a full set of interactions between all control variables and the 
time periods, to account for other features of candidate quality that may have shifted 
in importance across terms. The point estimates on  CityorCollegeTie × TimePeriod 
are virtually unchanged (though less precisely estimated). In columns 4 and 5 we 
further disaggregate the  post-Deng period into  Jiang (terms 15 and 16),  Hu (terms 
Table 6—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability by Group Size
Elected to Politburo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CityorCollegeTie −0.060 −0.067
(0.023) (0.022)
















Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,954 2,118 1,357 1,954 2,118 1,357
 R 2 0.312 0.213 0.327 0.311 0.212 0.327
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his 
city of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator 
 variable denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member 
at the time of election.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . 
In columns 1–3 we allow also for a differential effect of having two or more ties via a hometown or college. In 
 columns 4–6 we allow also for a differential effect of being a member of the largest group within a term. See the 
text for  additional details on variable construction. Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eli-
gible terms, a dummy variable for provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for 
the party  secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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17 and 18), and  Xi (term 19). All three interaction terms are negative, though (as 
expected) estimated with even less precision.
These patterns are broadly consistent with our reading of the relative emphasis 
on  anti-factionalism in the  postwar period, given the forcefulness of Mao’s stance 
on the issue in particular. That said, the stability of coefficients with the inclusion 
of  candidate-quality-times-time-period interactions notwithstanding, there are many 
features of Chinese politics that have shifted across decades and as such ascribing 
these  over-time patterns as related, even in part, to shifting attitudes toward faction-
alism is decidedly speculative.
Taking stock of the results in this section, the heterogeneity in the connections 
penalty provides greater support for some underlying mechanisms than others. 
In particular, the much stronger connections penalty for ties to junior Politburo 
members (who would be in more direct competition with newly elected members 
from their group) suggests a role for  within-group competition. By contrast, the 
 near-identical connections penalty for retiring and  non-retiring members argues 
















Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,954 2,118 1,357
 R 2 0.311 0.213 0.327
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the 
member of the Central Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator vari-
able denoting that the candidate shared his city of birth with an individual who was a Politburo 
member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate 
went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of elec-
tion.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . 
In each case, Retire denotes connections to a retiring Politburo member and  nonRetire denotes 
connections to those remaining in office the following term. Individual controls include gen-
der, age, education, previous eligible terms, a dummy variable for provincial leaders, a dummy 
variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for the party secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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against the most straightforward explanations based on quotas or other efforts to 
balance representation across groups. Similarly, we would expect such explanations 
to lead to a clearer increase in connections penalty as a function of the number of 
incumbent Politburo members from a group, which we do not observe in our data 
(though mainly because these specifications are imprecisely estimated). Finally, the 
patterns over time indicate that the connections penalty was far stronger under Mao. 
While there are many shifts in Chinese politics over this period, it is an intriguing 
finding given the forcefulness of Mao’s  anti-factional writings.
IV. Comparison to Earlier Estimates on Shared Background and Promotion
Given that our results stand in sharp contrast to the connections benefit docu-
mented in earlier work, we investigate which of the differences in our approach are 
responsible for the fact that our findings seem to contradict those of earlier work. We 
Table 8—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability by Periods
Elected to Politburo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CityorCollegeTie  × Mao −0.134 −0.127 −0.112 −0.134 −0.126
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
CityorCollegeTie  × Deng −0.034 −0.044 −0.049 −0.034 −0.044
(0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
CityorCollegeTie  × postDeng −0.063 −0.050 −0.051
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
CityorCollegeTie  × Jiang −0.067 −0.057
(0.048) (0.045)
CityorCollegeTie  × Hu −0.065 −0.055
(0.046) (0.042)
CityorCollegeTie  × Xi −0.050 −0.020
(0.068) (0.064)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls  × periods Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mao = Deng ( p-value) 0.038 0.073 0.220 0.039 0.076
Mao = postDeng ( p-value) 0.113 0.071 0.173
Mao = (postDeng + Deng)/ 2 ( p-value) 0.030 0.035 0.136
Observations 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954
 R 2 0.237 0.313 0.333 0.237 0.313
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his city 
of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable 
denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of 
election.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . The name of each 
leader is a dummy variable denoting elections that took place during his leadership terms: see the text for further 
details. Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eligible terms, a dummy variable for provin-
cial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for the party secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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believe that providing a bit of structure to this discussion is a further contribution of 
our paper given the range of approaches and assumptions in recent work on promo-
tion among elite Chinese politicians.
We focus primarily on three recent studies that we see as representing the most 
credible efforts at documenting the link between social connections and pro-
motion: Shih, Adolph, and  Liu (2012); Jia, Kudamatsu, and  Seim (2015); and 
Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016). Table 9 provides a summary of the key features 
of each of these papers, in comparison with our own, focusing on the following:
 •  Sample.—Both the level of hierarchy in which promotion is studied, as well as 
the time period;
 •  Variable Construction.—Measures of connections and also of promotion;
 •  Empirical Approach.—How the effect of shared background is identified, in 
particular  cross-sectional versus  difference-in-differences versus  within-group 
estimation.
As the table makes clear, each paper (including our own) makes distinct choices in 
data construction and estimation. However, by exploring more deeply the patterns in 
our own data, we are able to understand better the particular features of these earlier 
papers that drive the positive relationship between shared background and promo-
tion, and why our results differ from these prior estimates.
We begin reproducing the central result of earlier papers in our data, using defi-
nitions of shared background and estimation methodologies that are closer to those 
employed by prior studies. We define measures of shared background that center on 
workplace experience (an emphasis in all of the papers listed in Table 9), and that 
Table 9—Summary of Previous Studies of Connection Benefits
Francois et al. (2016) Shih et al. (2012) Jia et al. (2015) Our paper
Sample and data
Time period 13th–18th Congresses 12th–16th congress 1993–2009 
(14th–17th)
8th–19th
Candidate sample ACC through Politburo ACC through PSC Provincial leaders CC (and ACC)
Variable construction
Connection to General secretary General secretary PSC Politburo










Promotions  ACC-CC-Politburo-PSC  ACC-CC-Politburo- 
PSC-GS
Politburo, 





Methodology  Reduced-form and 
 model-based
 Reduced-form and 
 model-based




(based on GS turnover)
 Cross-sectional  Cross-sectional  Within-group
Notes: We employ the following abbreviations in the table: ACC is Alternates of the Central Committee; 
CC is Central Committee; PSC is Politburo Standing Committee; GS is General Secretary. See the text for 
more details.
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focus on connections to very  high-level officials. Specifically we define the follow-
ing indicators for shared background:
 (i)  WorkTie is the variable we employed earlier in our analysis to capture 
 overlapping work experience with at least one incumbent Politburo  member. 
We include this variable given the emphasis on workplace ties in earlier work.
 (ii)  WorkTie _ PSC to capture overlapping work experience with at least one 
incumbent Standing Committee member. We include this to account for the 
fact that all three earlier papers tend, in addition to focusing on work ties, to 
emphasize  higher-level connections.21
 (iii)  AnyTie which indicates that  WorkTie ,  CityTie , or  CollegeTie is equal to 1. 
This very inclusive measure has a mean of 0.66. We include this definition 
because some prior studies (including Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012) use all 
three types of shared background in defining connections.
 (iv)  AnyTie _ PSC which is analogous to  AnyTie but defined for Standing 
Committee connections only.
We present in Appendix Tables A2 and A3 results based on the  WorkTie and  AnyTie 
measures respectively. In each case, for both the main measure and also the 
 PSC-focused one, we present three sets of coefficient estimates: (i) controlling 
only for term; (ii) controlling for term as well as  candidate-level controls (age, past 
terms, etc.); (iii) including appropriate group fixed effects (workplace organization 
for the two  workplace-based measures, and workplace, hometown, and college fixed 
effects for the  AnyTie variables). A comparison between the unconditional estimates 
and those that account for candidate attributes provides an indication of how well 
these covariates account for quality differences, while a comparison to the fixed 
effects specification indicates the extent to which accounting for  group-level differ-
ences in quality (and hence promotion probability) affects our estimates. Focusing 
first on specifications that control only for term of selection, the coefficients on 
the shared background variables are all positive, large, and statistically significant. 
When we include our full set of standard candidate controls, the coefficients on the 
shared background variables all decline substantially, indicating that, in the absence 
of  individual-level controls, shared background was likely proxying at least in part 
for candidate quality. When we further add an appropriate set of fixed effects in the 
final columns in each table, the coefficients on the shared background variables are 
all estimated as close to 0.
21 As indicated in Table 9, for both Shih, Adolph, and Liu (2012) and Francois, Trebbi, and Xiao (2016), con-
nections are defined based on ties to the General Secretary only. We avoid this definition because we believe it to be 
too narrow, given the discussion of influence over Politburo selection provided in Section IA. Furthermore, it creates 
two distinct complications for our data. First, Deng never served as General Secretary, thus requiring an ad hoc shift 
in definition for this time period to account for his clear leadership role during his terms on the Standing Committee. 
Second, the timing of General Secretary transitions, which do not always coincide with Politburo selection, leading 
to further judgment calls in defining ties at this level. In practice, when we employ a definition based on General 
Secretary, the patterns are similar to those reported here: a positive association in the absence of workplace fixed 
effects, which disappears when workplace organization fixed effects are included.
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We draw two conclusions from the preceding results. First, relative to shared city 
and college background, there is a more positive pairwise association between over-
lapping work experiences and Politburo selection. We see as the most immediate 
explanation for this that workplace assignments are endogenous, and the result of 
an official’s career potential. While certain hometowns and colleges may produce 
more  high-potential bureaucrats, hometown or college “assignment” (in contrast to 
workplace assignment) is not caused by future promise as a politician.
We next turn to analyses based on  CityTie ,  CollegeTie , and  CityorCollegeTie , to 
further isolate the role that group fixed effects play in our estimated connections 
 penalty. We present the results for the composite  CityorCollegeTie variable in Table 
10, and relegate the other results to Appendix Table A4, as further robustness checks. 
We present specifications that employ the following specifications: (i) including 
controls only for term and individual candidate attributes; (ii) including term and 
individual candidate controls, and limiting the sample to individuals affiliated with 
groups that have at least one connected candidate during our whole sample period; 
(iii) as in (ii), but also including appropriate group  fixed effects. A comparison of 
(i) versus (ii) will indicate the extent to which our results differ from earlier work 
because we effectively get rid of variation from  never-connected groups, while a 
comparison of (ii) versus (iii) indicates the extent to which our results differ because 
we throw out  between-group variation entirely.
The patterns in Table 10 suggest that, while both factors play some role in gen-
erating the connections penalty in our fixed effects specifications, the addition of 
fixed effects in column 3 is the more decisive factor. Comparing column 1 (corre-
sponding to specification (i)) and column 2 (corresponding to specification (ii)), 
Table 10—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability,  
Understanding the Role of Group Fixed Effects
Elected to Politburo
 (1) (2) (3)
CityorCollegeTie 0.007 −0.005 −0.063
(0.012) (0.014) (0.023)
 Never-connected groups excluded Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes
College fixed effects Yes
Observations 2,176 1,456 1,324
 R 2 0.132 0.129 0.308
Notes: The sample in columns 2 and 3 includes any individual from a hometown or college 
with at least one Politburo connection during the sample period. See text for further details. 
The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member 
of the Central Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denot-
ing that the candidate shared his city of birth with an individual who was a Politburo mem-
ber at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate 
went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of elec-
tion.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 . 
Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eligible terms, a dummy variable 
for provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for the party 
secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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we see that the exclusion of  never-connected hometowns leads the coefficient 
on  CityorCollegeTie to decline by 1.2 percentage points. (The results in Table A4 
indicate that this decline is driven by the  CityTie variable.)
Comparing these results in turn to our fixed effects specifications (limiting 
the sample to those with variation in the relevant type of tie) in column 3 (corre-
sponding to specification (iii)), we find a much sharper decline in the coefficient 
on  CityorCollegeTie , of nearly 6 percentage points.
Taken together, the results in Table 10 and Appendix Tables A2–A4 indicate that 
our results differ from that of prior findings on Politburo selection because of our 
focus on city and college rather than workplace connections, as the coefficients for 
the former two types of ties are uniformly lower, regardless of the specification, 
and the inclusion of group fixed effects, which leads to a more negative relation-
ship between shared background and Politburo selection, regardless of the type of 
connection.
In our final set of results, we examine the role of shared background in the 
promotion of Central Committee alternates to full membership in the Central 
Committee. We include these analyses in the current section because, as observed 
in Table 9, the promotions studied in earlier papers also include those of  lower-level 
officials. Looking at the promotion of alternates allows us to consider whether the 
level of candidates in the Party hierarchy also affects our estimated connections 
penalty.
As noted in Section  IA, Central Committee selection is conducted by the 
Politburo, and while there is not a  well-defined set of candidates (as is the case for 
the Politburo, for which the Central Committee defines the candidate pool), the 
high rate of promotion from alternate to full membership of the Central Committee 
 suggests that the former is a credible pool of candidates to study.
We present these results in Appendix Table  A5, for  CityTie ,  CollegeTie , 
and  CityorCollegeTie . Before briefly discussing the results, a few notes are in order. 
First, because there are less systematic data available on Central Committee alter-
nates, our set of control variables is somewhat thinner. Second, we are able to pro-
vide a direct measure of candidate popularity, based on the number of votes received 
during the Central Committee election. The ranks that result from these voting data 
are released to the public. A candidate’s rank has real consequences: if a full mem-
ber of the Central Committee is absent from a meeting (due to sickness, death, or 
arrest), the alternate Central Committee member with the highest votes serves as 
a temporary replacement. Finally, we observe that Central Committee alternates 
come from a somewhat wider range of educational backgrounds than those with full 
membership. In our data, we observe 527 distinct colleges for alternate members. 
Particularly given the smaller size of the alternate Central Committee body, this 
leads to a relatively large number of individuals who are the only representative of 
their college in the data.
With these observations and caveats in mind, we show results for promotion of 
alternates to full membership, both with and without group fixed effects. Our main 
finding is that the inclusion of group fixed effects once again leads to a lower esti-
mated relationship between shared background and selection. Unlike our results on 
Politburo selection, however, we find that the relationship between shared home-
town/college background and promotion is positive and significant in the absence 
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of fixed effects, and near zero with fixed effects included.22 These results suggest 
that the prominence of Politburo selection in particular may be responsible in part 
for the results we report in Section II. However, a more systematic evaluation of this 
possibility will require a distinct and ambitious data collection, in order to assess the 
relationship between shared background and promotion at lower levels of the Party 
hierarchy.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we document that, among candidates for China’s Politburo, those 
with hometown or college ties to incumbent Politburo members are less likely to 
be elected. Our results are of particular note because they stand in sharp contrast to 
the findings of earlier papers. We examine heterogeneity in the connections penalty, 
and observe that it is much stronger for ties to more junior Politburo members, 
which suggests that competition among officials with shared backgrounds may at 
least partly explain our main results. The fact that we observe a similar connec-
tions penalty for ties to retiring and  non-retiring Politburo members argues against 
 quota-based explanations.
Because our results contrast with those of earlier papers, we delve into the fea-
tures of our estimation to account for the differences in findings. We suggest that 
both the type of shared background that one uses to measure connections, as well as 
the use of within- versus  between-group variation, can help to explain our findings 
of a connections penalty.
Taking a broader view, our main analysis and findings emphasize also the care 
required in analyzing observational data on connections. In particular, in consider-
ing the full set of potential explanations for our results, we highlight the nuanced 
relationship between shared backgrounds and promotion. And by comparing results 
based on within- versus  between-group variation, we show how  cross-sectional 
analyses may be biased toward finding a positive effect of connections when none 
exists.
22 The lack of any robust correlation between shared background and promotion to full Central Committee 
membership also argues against negative selection into the pool of Politburo candidates for connected individuals, 
which could itself lead to the connections “penalty” we document in our main results.
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Appendix
Table A1—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability,  
Full Set of Individual Controls Listed
Elected to Politburo









log(Age) 0.059 −0.035 0.030 0.060
(0.050) (0.095) (0.047) (0.069)
Prior Candidacies 0.050 0.054 0.036 0.055
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011)
Provincial 0.024 0.044 0.050 0.026
(0.017) (0.022) (0.015) (0.022)
Military −0.011 −0.010 0.015 −0.017
(0.014) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021)
4_Leaders 0.671 0.695 0.664 0.591
(0.089) (0.090) (0.075) (0.116)
College 0.005 −0.006
(0.013) (0.013)
Master 0.004 −0.032 −0.008 −0.011
(0.017) (0.024) (0.016) (0.027)
Doctor −0.016 −0.036 0.009 −0.032
(0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.034)
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,118 1,357 2,176 1,954 2,118 1,357 2,176 1,954
 R 2 0.109 0.209 0.305 0.234 0.212 0.327 0.386 0.311
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his city 
of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator vari-
able denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the 
time of election.  WorkTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same department in 
the same city at the same time as at least one Politburo member.  CityorCollegeTie is an indicator variable denot-
ing that  CityTie = 1 or  CollegeTie = 1 .  PriorCandidacies is the number of previous terms the individual was a 
 Politburo-eligible member of the Central Committee.  Provincial is an indicator variable denoting that the candi-
date was provincial governor or party secretary at the time of the election.  Military is an indicator variable denoting 
that the candidate was a  high-ranking military official at the time of the election.  4 _ Leaders is an indicator variable 
denoting that the candidate was the party secretary of one of three municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, or 
the party secretary of Guangdong.  Princeling denotes that one or more of the candidate’s parents or  parents-in-law 
ever served as a Politburo member.  Male denotes the candidate’s gender.  College ,  Master , and  Doctor denote com-
pletion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees (note that  College is the omitted category in specifications 
involving college fixed effects). Standard errors clustered by candidate in all regressions.
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Table A2—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability:  
Further  Worktie-Focused Specifications
Elected to Politburo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WorkTie 0.071 0.051 −0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
WorkTie_PSC 0.084 0.066 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176
 R 2 0.0221 0.0285 0.139 0.144 0.386 0.386
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the 
member of the Central Committee was elected to the Politburo.  WorkTie is an  indicator  variable 
denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same department in the same city at the same 
time as at least one Politburo member. The suffix PSC denotes connections to the Standing 
Committee.
Table A3—Politburo Ties and Candidate Election Probability,  
Incorporating Work, College, and Hometown Ties
Elected to Politburo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AnyTie 0.059 0.042 −0.022
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017)
AnyTie_PSC 0.073 0.060 0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.022)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workplace fixed effects Yes Yes
College fixed effects Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,176 2,176 1,954 1,954
 R 2 0.0177 0.0243 0.137 0.142 0.534 0.534
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the 
member of the Central Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator vari-
able denoting that the candidate shared his city of birth with an individual who was a Politburo 
member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candi-
date went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of 
election.  WorkTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate’s worked at the same 
department in the same city at the same time as at least one Politburo member.  AnyTie is an indi-
cator variable denoting that  CityTie = 1 ,  CollegeTie = 1 , or  WorkTie = 1 . The  suffix PSC 
denotes connections to the Standing Committee. In columns 1 and 2 we include an  indicator 
variable denoting college attendance, to distinguish college attendance from  college connec-
tions. Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eligible terms, a dummy 
variable for provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy  variable for 
the party secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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Table A4—Understanding the Role of Fixed Effects, Disaggregating City and College Ties
Elected to Politburo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CityTie 0.008 −0.025 −0.047
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
CollegeTie 0.011 0.013 −0.083
(0.018) (0.021) (0.035)
 Never-connected groups excluded Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Term fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hometown fixed effects Yes
College fixed effects Yes
Observations 2,176 1,524 1,174 873 1,174 839
 R 2 0.132 0.17 0.133 0.158 0.172 0.277
Notes: The sample in columns 3 and 5 includes only candidates from hometowns with at least one Politburo 
 connection during the sample period. The sample in columns 4 and 6 does this for college ties. See text for  further 
details. The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator variable denoting that the member of the Central 
Committee was elected to the Politburo.  CityTie is an indicator variable denoting that the candidate shared his 
city of birth with an individual who was a Politburo member at the time of election.  CollegeTie is an indicator 
 variable denoting that the candidate went to the same university as an individual who was a Politburo member at 
the time of election. Individual controls include gender, age, education, previous eligible terms, a dummy variable 
for  provincial leaders, a dummy variable for military leaders, a dummy variable for the party secretaries of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangdong, and a Princeling dummy.
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